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Congressman Walter Flowers of Alabama I - 1. 
All talking at once! 
DFS - Railsback followed the questions right through, Mann did 
something else. Why don't you just start 1, 2, 3? 
WF - Do you want to do it that way, or there's a couple of things 
that I had. I gather we got olenty of tape and nothing 
else to do unless the bells ring and then I'll be right 
back. There is one ingredient that probably doesn't come 
up any,·1here in this thing, that is the fact of the .8JA'2.filn~ 
P.r,j ~ r~.,_r:i 7e.t~ht ch,,.t!,~~;:1~;:"'t.~*-~r.J.X.,,~PrJ ng , Qf,, ':-14 ~ _ centerirrg 1n the election or ncmnnat10rr of Mey·~-:!.-~ ~ :t...cb 
was : two::days~hefore '"the~first ""'meiftirig ~of ~ttfe 'crimmittee 
· on May. 9th .. ,;;;J: was7 the ·-.on 1 y member .absent. It turned 
out that it was the only meeting of the committee that I 
was every absent. I remained down in Alabama throughout 
the remainder of that week, I had an important, dedication, 
ground-breaking of a lock and dam on the Tennessee-Tombigbee 
Waterway. Well, in that primary race last year, an opponent 
was a woman who ·- had run against ~me in '72' from the extreme 
left wing. She was an extreme liberal who came out swinging 
from the word go, claiming more or less that I w_as~ 1: 
Ni xort!s .:man_ '.J n :Alabama·: The camp~i gn : theme---;thatzsh-e--:naffi 
was a' broom·, -- you know, let's clean up the mess in 
Washinaton and sweeping that up. Let's 'sweep out the old 
and sweep in the ·nevi. Flowers is Nixon's good right hand 
man in Alabama and he is an ultra conservative and he is 
just like Nixon and that crowd and we want to get rid of 
him on for impeachment now. Later on that day, after the 
vote, she said, well, after the fact, she said, "I was 
for it all along, he didn't need a]l that other stuff. 11 
Running in Alabama and in the primary against me in '72 
and at that point got about 35-36% of the vote in the 
primary. Her support cam from a lot of black votes in 
that district which of course is 40%. Because she kept 
peopering away at me and it .was almost , it was 1.J!,e.;,;~ 
design -to ··make .. me·- decl ar e-:on-.the- i ssue···oL1 moeacfiment. 
That hecame the only issue, how do you stand· on Nixon? 
Most times in an election like that, vou could throw a 
bone out there and or come out either-half way in support 
of the major proposition of the opponent you could cut 
the legs out from under them, you know. But this was 







I .., 2. 
WF - - Flowers ought to impeach that so-and-so President. If 
I'd said I'm for impeachment, then she .would have had to 
eventually withdraw from the race. That was just the way 
it got to be. ~•tY.~ wjJ~~ ~mJrd~.9"- me of this ::at--•~the.J..ti111.e_:;;,i~• 
s_tarted "ouJ;"'-doin_g :.this · and she s·aid ·be 0 Sure -:-ahd;mentiorf;; 
the- primary. Nm·, it I s one of those things that had escaped 
my mind, but in retrospection, it's probably one of those 
things that made me so steadfast in refusing to declare 
was this. I think because she was so adamant to make me 
declare that I just couldn't conceive of a declaration before 
all the facts w~re in and I just, it became almost a moral 
co;:-mitment that I would not declare, I would refuse myself 
the luxury of even halfway fanning a judgment /until I 
had everything in front of me. And that's what I said 
during the campaign and it staved with me; ,the_. conviction 
that I 'had -t o stay~in"'the "middle '-until :-th-e- end: 
DFS - Did she have any different cormnent after your vote, that 
Saturday night? 
WF - Oh, it was just that I was a fraud and that I didn't need 
all that evidence, just really sour grapes. There was 
one other sort of prelimiary area of interest in my district 
that attracted some attention and we had an NBC ~crew.?"come 
down to Alabama _in the sp_r._tng:_.time before we really got 
involved. They got with me a couple of days, trotting 
around my district, the newsman covering it was Steve 
Delaney. He went to a few of the small towns, just a 
typical cross-section, that 1 s what he wanted and that's 
what we gave him there, where I 1 d meet with various people 
and I think that he became _really._convinced j_n ·. his-•own ._ 
rnirtd ·that ~there's no ' way Flm~ers-was ·· going·;to: vote':;::for:?i 
impeachment : · NBC did this with Delaney earlier on and then 
they prepared to track him after we had voted to see the 
change from l'Tl'J district; they had a crew down there during 
the week after the committee activity in July and early 
August. Then all of this washed out and the resignation 
came in the second week of August and instead of a long -run 
on Broadway, we had a short one. I know when I first 
more or less presented myself to the public, after the 
end of the inquiry it was at home and I had a press con-
ference in Tuscaloosa in the Federal Building where my 
office is located and on the Monday following the completion 
of the comnittee activity, I had a press conference and 
that was the same day as the revelation of the June 23rd 
tape came out. My press conference was in the a.m. and 
that hit the new in the afternoon and that press conference 
( 
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HF - was old by the time that hit because it was all over. It 
almost became inevitable that he resign and when that 
hit the news, I think everybody began talking about what 
was going to happen· in the Senate trial. I know in the 
press conference one of the major things they wanted to know 
was I likely to be one of the House managers and would I 
accept such a desi gnation by the Chairman. Of course, I 
didn't know if I was likel y to be one, but I advised that 
I was, of course, willing to serve should I be chosen. 
DFS - In t hi s connecti cn, I knm'I th~t on about the 6th of Auqust, 
the Alabama Journa ·1, i n- :'liGntgomery, sai d "Possibly Fl owers 
pushed the first rock that started the avalanche that 
bureid the President. 11 
WF - I remember that myself, you had it in the composite there, 
I think that if anything the question had got jumped on 
in an unusual way on me because the local media, as well 
as the national media, began focusing earlier on who might 
be the Democrats who would do otherwise and who might be 
the Republicans who might vote for impeachment. And it 
became clear earlier, that you're dealing with 10 or 11 
people at the most who would make the difference. I think 
the ones who were sure to vote for impeachment were there 
and weren't going to change .. I don't care what happened, 
even if the Lord had come down in the morning on Richard 
Nixon wouldn't have mattered. By the same token, you~ · 
weren I t going to change Chuck Sandman no matter what the/ 'f---· 
evidence showed. You had those of us who had for various 
reasons that thought we were fair, now I 1m very frank, 
that you get conditioned not to make a judgment until it 
becomes necessary to make a judgment. You got a way of 
putting it down where I come from, you want to stay in the 
forks of the tree as long as you can. Maybe the old barking 
dog will go away or something. Maybe you won't have to 
declare. Some- of my ·people were for Nixon and some .were 
against him, and I'm for my people :- It became ultimately 
evident that there were 10 or 11, give or take a few, who 
were going to make a difference, the ones that hadn't 
declared. And I think we became more interesting to the 
press because of that. It was not our intention to do that 
way, but we didn't avoid the attention we got and the Alabama 
press became very interested because I do_".!._'._. t :thi11~~;ther:~_h__a~ 
ever--be·en an occasion- where there had been a House . 
Reoresentative from Alabama had b-een .. thrust on· then ·at ional-~' 
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bit and they didn't know very much about me. I had never 
run for anything except the Congress and I was relatively 
new;·I was in my third term and allthese things kind of 
built up in what's Flowers going to do and it was kind of 
natural that the papers, you know a lot of littli state 
pride. I didn't discourage that either and I didn't deny 
it. I think that all of us certainly did it. One thing 
too, I think my ·staff; did for me, they were great throughout 
the whole thing, most of them were fairly on: edge, particularly 
my staff in 'Alabama, because they .felt like 0if.."" I- ·voted 
for :....impeat~ment .that Lit was- ,,the .:.politial end :· Particularly 
my senior staff member- in Alabama, he is a gentleman by the 
name of Andrew Deerland; he comes from a small rural county, 
that conservative area, Nixon country. His closer circle 
of acquaintances, I mean the real Nixon die-hards, particularly 
early on. This would be the last election and that's 
what they believed. But the Alabama staff, as well as 
my Washington staff, pretty much kept the bad news away 
from me; they understood because I'd said it so many times 
that I didn't care what happen~d representative wise in this 
instance. Generally speaking, my office and I and my 
whole product, my who 1 e policy is -stay in ·touch 'wi th_;the 
people, . to know what the people want, to inject what we 
think is best for the peoole and try to reach a compromise 
that's my position. But in this instance, that cquld , 
not be my position, b~fause I thought my responsibility 
under the Constitution oub,eighed any representative-
capacity: I wanted to know what the people were thinking, 
but I put it in some other kind of category. I didn't 
run the regular computer on it. They heard me say that 
and they believed me. They kep away the letters saying 
you better, you so-and-so, you better support our President. 
And that was the way my mail was running from early on. 
You-all get this thing over with so Mr. Nixon can get 
back to being President. You're distracting "our" President 
from what we elected him to do. That was the major thrust 
of the communications that we received. 
DFS - .I got a kick out of your statement that they thought 
McGovern would take over. 
WF - That's right: That's right. S_o_me peopl~ though_t ·th~t ... ifi:~ ' i 
you booted N1 xon out that McGovern would become Pres 1 dent ~ ) 
There was that kind of frustration running through a whole 
lot of people. I don't know, people were so tired of 
it, that here we go again, another crowd, they didn't get 
their publicity when the Senate had the ball, and they are 
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Are- they _ _goJng ·to, end up -fumbl_ing -arO!Jnd -and :.~ave·.:no·,~finafe~·, 
like the Senate? j ihat : ~eop1~-"-didn 1 t unders'tand earlier 
on and I think we didn't have a full grasp of it either, is 
that there was and end, there v,as a_ ]lgh_:t ..,9-.:t;;,tbe.,..en_i:Qf:-·-
the tonne 1 ~for: the ~Judtci.ary-::;Coiiin-i ttee / we ·were ar some'"l 
point ·•going ·to vote -:it ;eith·er. up -or-do",~n. -=-\ And the Senate 
didn't realli-have .. that option and it was an entirely 
different thing. I think that is one of the reasons you 
can sav that our oublic time was successful. - I think it 
basjcail y was, it was short, it was to the point, it was 
comp letely captivating the public's attention. The Senate 
had it early on and it just dwindled off and at the end 
it was bad. Ours was on the up the whole way, I think 
after Saturday ~aybe, it went down a little bit, but still 
it was so short and to the point. I think that because 
the great job that my staff did, it kind of insulated me 
from certain pressures; I don't mean that anybody would 
kind of twist my arm or anything, but we had continuing 
little small licks, support our President, support our 
President. There was one .big flap which you had in your 
summary that got on the national ·wire about the word that 
somebody said that Gov. Wa11ace called somebody. - I don't 
think anything like ~that ·happened. : 
(=· DFS - You never heard it? 
WF - I talked to Senator Allen one time but he's a close personal 
friend of mine, and he's such a gentleman that even had 
Gov. Wallace called him he wouldn't have done it. He might 
have called me on some spurious thing and say, ."yeah, 
I called Walter, because he is a friend of Wallace's, too" 
but he would never have tried to influence me on a matter 
like that. 
DFS - On the Tuesday after the vote on the second article, you 
make this statement about Dick, $400,000, and so on. 
Do you think, looking back now, that the fact that you 
realized then the Republican money was being funneled in 
and Wallace was being looked at by the IRS .- · did . that.c have 





I - 6. 
HF - On me? Yeah;: _it had; that's not why I supoorted that article 
by any means; it was just I think evidence to me that here 
these people had gotten so confounded arrogant and they 
weren't ~ontent with.manipulating a nation~l _electi?n-~-------->: .. 
the feel ,ng of many ,n Alabama was ~they"~wanted -to manipulate -:-, 
an cc· election in -the ,State-·of Alaoama. You know, way down 
in Alaba~a ~~d it wasn't even a general election, it was a ~ 
Democratic primary . in Alabama. That just seemed terribly 
arroaant to me. It was the kind of attitude that exemplified 
thei~ manipulation of various statements which in~luded 
the IRS. They had peppered av,ay and had the Governor's 
brother under invest i gati on ._ I t had come to my attention 
at that time that -- I remember that I had hoped sincerely 
that it was not politically motivated and it made an 
indelible imoression that this came uo last year, and it 
had been politically motivated. It just didn't really set. 
When _I was talking to article tv,o and using those examples, 
I was frankly communi eating with the -pe6pl e that~I~repre-
sented and wanted them to understand that I felt thcit -
would be a good device for convincing them ·1:hat I was on 
the right track. And I don't know whether it did or not. 
The people in Alabama are either a1l for Wallace or all 
against him. Itisdivided among some of the people. 
One other series of things that I really got across to most 
of the people that I didn, i·,as the motion to strike that 
I filed on the various subparagraphs of article one. 
What was really the confused time I think. I think there 
was a couple, three days in there, from the Tuesday morning 
that our really Unholy Alliance put it all together, 
following through the voting on that Saturday night. 
Those were the action days of course, Tuesday through 
Saturday, . wjth.the motions to strike thing, at least to 
my way of thinking was the period in which the whole thing 
was turned arouncr:from what we oenerallv considered a 
losing proposition when the Nix~n defen~ers started pounding 
us with their demands for specificity and I think we were 
really weak in giving it to them early on. If Sandman ,; 
didn't file his motion to strike -which we debated -fa·r ·:~'t oo :~. 
long on- the . first paragraph, ·! was prepared to use it -,,-~:~: 
before he did. It was unfolding much better if he had 
maintained his position and filed it as to the remaining 
oaragraphs so that I would not have had to do it. It would 
not have had to come from one of the ones who were committed 
for i mpeachment at that point. I think Sandman is a sharo 
operator, and it figure d that he would play into our hands 
and he decided not to carry on and the funny thing is 
everybody else wanted to let it go at that point. 
.0.:1 .,.~ ,,....,.,J; 
!,' { -1! ~ ,f ' ,l't,11 -
/~--- · , __ ..,..,. . ,,,,.,.-r··· 
- '} . ~/ . ' 
" ,i,~• =- r _ _.,,. 
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Railsback didn't want to go further. Nobody \~anted to 
continue, they were willing to go along with me but I 
was out there by myse 1 f. Maybe Bill Cohen understood and 
I think maybe Caldwell Butler. But ~YQQQY .... else wgnted:;-.. 
to -get _j t _over ..l'till,.~.t...!h.~~t point .:;-We 1] ·,.:-_I-/di dn~t .::_'9 ruL~ 
of ·see it that way _because r ::felt wenad :d~firiitely "~ton~ 
the round. The initial motion to- strike Sandman filed, 
and so I said, "Man, this is a device that \'le ought to use 
any way in our favor 'til someone could continue with it. " 
So I went out and struck out two. He talked too long again. 
Wel 1, after.,,ards we 1 imi ted debate, unanimous consent. 
r t hink. one .. of t he oddest f~el in-g s that I' ve. e-very ha<l 
in my life was on subparagraph three -- the ffrst one that 
we had a record vote on. I didn't talk about how I was 
going to vote on my own motion to strike. I had moved 
to strike subparagraph three and they demanded a record 
vote. I said I was for it because I certainly don't want 
to strike the material, it is vital to supporting the 
article. I don't want to vote no, on my own motion to 
strike, that seems to be absolutely ridiculous position 
to be in particularly when I had every intention of filing 
the same motion on the next subparagraphs. - r ~said ~ "you· 
got no, and you- got -aye, and YO.!J ain 'l:gp_·t .. @e.J2!h_e-r '""!': 
thing and :that's _ p7=esent~~•-~ An9_. in my time~in the Congress, 
that's the only tim~ I ever voted present on any~ isstfe'~ 
And I had some soul say, "Flowers, all you did was to 
want to get before a national camera and all this and then 
you couldn't even make up your own mind. 11 
(Laughter) 
SL - How did you finally feel about th~ paragraph where you 
finally did vote present? 
WF - Well, I knew I was going to fail, but I think I carried 
through it cause I did thing that ought to be taken out. 
I didn't think it was fully supported by the evidence and 
I had a purpose in advance. I got a little opening there 
and Charley Sandman gave me a chance to jab back at him 
a little bit. I got him. But we had a lot of fun, Sandman 
and I have several occasions right after to be on news 
programs together and we had been and still are personal 
friends and I remember imitating him several times: 
"It's AMAZING!" 
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But there are still some people t hat say, "Walter, you 
really did great, but I don't understnad still v1hat you 
were doing voting present." There 't1as one, I don't know 
if I can describe this, but it is a very significant 
occurrence to me on the night that Nixon made his - resigna-
tion speech, the news media were, I'in. sure, _) ining up 
members of the .Committee to be on various programs and I 
had -been locke~ in by ABC radio ahd ABC news and ABC 
television to be at the various studios at various times 
after the speech. Any,.-,ay, this was Charles Sandman and 
I on a couple of these things together. The program was 
I think the ABC news panel, but we left the hotal where 
t heir studio was, that's where we watched the speech on 
television. I thi nk it was t hat night, in fact, that 
we commente·d on it afterwards. · So we went out the-re 
together leaving the Capitol a little bit earlier than we 
needed to. We didn't know what kind of traffic to anticipate, 
it was less though, than what we were getting into. 
We drove along the roadway out -there·.where .. you look across 
the tidal basin to the -Jefferson Memorial. This is kind of 
corny, but I want to tell everything and so I said let's 
go over ot it, you know we got a little time, let's kind 
of just check ir over there, I've been a Jefferson admirer 
all my life. We talked about constitutional processes 
a~d this seemed like the perfect time and so we ended up 
actually in the Jefferson -Memorial in the rotunda there 
and that night right before_ we were going to -listen · . .to 
the words of the President resigning. And, as you come up 
the steps, there's the excerpts from the words of Jefferson 
which really gave the real basics of what we were doing 
on impeaching the President. It was just such a startling -
experience for me in that the analogy was so great it 
was a very notworthy experience for me at that time. 
I've never attempted to put it down as to what my thoughts were 
then, but before we get through with this thing, I'm going 
to do that. I don't think Charley had the same feeling, 
it was mostly just me and it was my decision to go there 
and I got just a personal feeling for those basic documents 
that is hard to describe but it Has so exemplary that 
experience. That the system which had become to me and 
always has been but through these turbulent months which 
we had been i nvo 1 ved in this inquiry, the defense of and 
the preservation of the system is what become so all-
encompassing, so over-powering. The man that Richard Nixon, 
that my constituents felt that I should defend to my dying 
day, was not the \•Jay I saw it. It was .. the
0
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WF - That's the way it was on that night particularly. The 
impression that I'm going to try to recapture in my own 
words before \•le get through. I men ti on it now so that 
should I forget it ..• 
(VOTE) 
WF - One thing that I remember is that one of the members, you 
might say a main-stream Democrat, told me on the House 
floor one day, that he had early on decided that he was 
going to vote for impeachment. Congressman Jim Stanton, 
I remember was getting ready, one of the times that tickled 
me, to make a speech,- a one-minute speech. Sta?1ton went 
over to O' Neill and said "Tip, you're just wasting your 
time," he said, "I'm for impeachment, too, but I don't 
think Flowers is considerina it. 11 Stanton told me that 
Walter Flowers got tired ofJhearing you talk about it on 
the Hill, and when Flowers starts talkina about it that's 
when I start thinking it might." -- (Laughter). 
DFS - When was that, would you say? 
WF - Oh, that was maybe in June or something like that. Early 
June, maybe May, shortly after we started the public, not 
the public, but the actual inquiry. And it occurred to 
me, I had not read the Breslin book, but I understand he 
gives a whole lot of credit to O'Neill which I don't know 
'I/here that comes from. Frankly, at one point I can remember 
Tip asking how thinkgs were going and that's the extent of 
it. I don't think Tip O'Neill had any influence over the 
final outcome or the shaping of articles or even the fact 
that we reached a decision when we did because if anything 
his early pressures on Rodino were to hustle up an early 
decision. And I think, quite frankly, had that occurred, 
they would have lost the necessary middle of the readers 
that shaped it in the final analysis • . If there is one 
attribute of Rodino, that was his patience. Th~ P?tience 
of Peter Rodino was what really paid off -in the lon~i-run~~ 
DFS - Bresling was probably just another fellow drinking Irishmar0 >if 
of O'Neill, that's all. . ./ 
WF - I think that's right. (Laughter). I think those were the 
basic things that might not have come out, I made notes on~ 
I didn't anyway mention all of them. I just leave it to 
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DFS - ! . think we wi 11 , if you like develop further on the r -fr .. 
Jefferson Memorial. ._.., ~
WF - I'll make some further notes on that in the quiet of the t 
night, I can do that. It did make an impression on me · 
and, as I recall, I used it in a speech and I'll get a 
copy of that speech, too, to refresh my recollection o~ 
it and go from there. 
DFS - Just a couple of things we asked the other members. 
Going back, for example to the 31st of July, when Drinan 
introduced the first resolution to impeach, that's 1 73, 
what was your reaction to that? 
WF - I didn't take it seriously. Drinan .~is ·a: guy:that.'.:.is:. 
· programmed_;':you~ know'~here--:r•fie ,; s ;and,..,you know_where.'.::he;;.i.s.:. 
going. to -end up. He may fuss around between here and there, 
but this was to me typical. I don't mean to be dis-
respectful of him. It was a typical thing for him to do, 
and I didn't take it seriously anq I didn't thin, it would 
lead to anyt_hing. I know he made a big splash about it 
on the, he had a news oonference, he got some publicity 
on it, but I don't really think anybody took it real 
serious at that point. It was premature at that point. 
I don't know exectly what was on his mind, even to think 
to consider even voting to impeach then. i..___.., 
DFS - Now of all these things, you might look at number two 
there, which one or ones were probably among the first 
to make impeachment become a kind of possibility? 
HF - Well, subsequent to the so-called Saturday Night Massacre, 
it became something a lot of people started to think about, 
although even at that point, I thought it was very 
premature and I kept, high places, could arrive at some 
solution that would apparently pass. I couldn't believe 
it had gotten as far as it did. I know one thing that 
in that period, just thoroughly turned me off, was the 
proposed reference of this .thing to · Senator Stenni s::.and ._~tbe --:. 
television and the President himself referred to John as 
Judge Stennis. Senator John Stennis had b~en in the Senate 
for 30 years. I can't see for them to drag out the fact 
that he had been a Judge so many many ears ago and refer 
to him as Judge Stennis. Now, I've learned that some of 
his oldest friends do call him Judge in a personal sort of 













I thought it was just a p e tty ploy to elevate this guy to 
this sort of a j udge type in a role. That's the reasons that 
they wanted to send the tapes to him for listening and to 
verify the transcripts, and I thought that that was jus·t a 
dirty trick ~- so to state. And that came about in the period 
just preceding the .. S-aturday Night Massacre, I guess a few 
days before that, that was when they were trying to work out ' 
some kind of solution. At that point you start thinking that 
there is really something that is, not only the lower echelon 
is trying to hide, but it's way up in high places · that can't 
stand the heat. And, ah, I -was embarrassed when the .. newspape.rs 
showed ·the fact that ·the·~-FBI had cordohea"•off~~ h-e"":-prosecutor ~ s 
office and they had more or less impounded the goods there to 
make sure it was almost like they were going to purge the whole 
operation for a few· hours. Then things kind of leveled off 
after that, when Jaworski was selected. We had a sort of 
potential flap in the Committee over the Hungate subcommittee 
time and the set up of the special prosecutor, you remember 
that bill -caine-.o·ut of comrrt1ttEfo-.zand ·-r was the only Democr.at 
that vot_ed -against it : Bu~ they never _ had_ the nerve - to put 
it on the House Floor because I -think they would have been · 
beaten on the House Floor. I think there for just a little 
while it had the whole thrust of a kind of possibility of 
becoming a Democratic move to get the President. Because here 
was Jaworski with the highest credentials, here we were, we 
weren't willing to accept this man, we were willing to kind 
of tie it up. It just didn't seem right to me. So I opposed 
that in Committee and I think that the decision, whoever made 
it to hold it, to not elevate it, or escalate it to the House 
as a form was a wise decision. I think it was maybe not a 
decision, it was just a reaction to the inevitable defeat of 
it. But still it wasn't the bringing up a bill that we knew 
was not going to go over, just as we knew we weren't going to 
override the veto today, t~at was brought up anyway. Had we 
had a long, drawn out debate about the Watergate prosecutor 
in the fall of 73, we could have lost a lot of the steam for 
the rest of the inquiry. There were two other subjects that 
jolts my blood warmer than any other until we really got down 
to the review stage where we looked down that road and saw 
all that, the wrecked vehicles and the bodies that were lying 
in the wake, and that is really when I decided that I had to 
vote for impeachment. The second period was when they first 
refused the subpoena, and I had a word or two to say that got 
picked up by a couple of reporters including the Los Angeles 
Times about playing games with the Constitution and the 
President was off in Texas making a speech somewhere and some 
of these other people were somewhere else and the talk about that 
we had all the evidence we needed. They were trying to go to 
the people over the heads of the Congress and the legitimate 









I made some remarks in ~ Committee; I don't think I even hav 
a copy of the completed remarks I made. But it was just a sho 
statement to the effect that they were barking up the wrong tr 
and that it was in their backyard and not ours and for them to 
stop playing games with the Constitution, which would have bee 
in the remarks of March or April. 
21st of March, I have here, "we see developing the intricate 
maneuver of the strategy to limit this Committee and confuse 
the issues stop playing with our Constitution." 
The next I'd say peak of the responsibility of it came apparent 
to me was the day we heard the March 21st tape ; which - t --:- thought 
wa.s :shocking·; .. I thought it was devast'atin g~. Because here we ha 
been kind of going along in periods of a lot of verbage, a lot 
of very unL.1teresting kind of lulling us to sleep at the hands 
of Doar and Jenner. Going back to the one in which he had 
announced the resignation of Haldeman and Ehrlichman, now each 
time he went public either on television, radio, or news 
reports, it was downhill. Each time his position, at least 
in my eyes, was substantially lowered because he was obviously 
backing. You didn't even· the hand in front of you, the facts 
and figures just from your own recollection of what was said 
the preceeding appearance you know the second one was a fall 
back, and the next one was a fall back and it was just a series 
of fall backs, and this began really with ·his first back in 
September of 72. I'm sure that after that it just almost _got 
to be a comedy. ~:t ":was-:ju_s:t:-.d,isgu~ting ·:to--me - to -say-·-the .ieast. 
Do you recall earlier in the proceedings, the Committee discusse 
what is an impeachable offense and Doar staff issued a brief on 
that, the White House issued a brief -- taking a · very narrow 
view that it had to be an indictable offense and the Department 
of Justice also had a brief and they kind of discussed the 
narrow and broad view of w~at is an impeachable offense. Did 
you come to some kind of feeling or definition of an impeachable 
offense? 
I probably was somewhere in between in my own mind and closer 
to the broad view than the narrow view. I don '.t ~think : yo_u 
cou_ld ·anywhere accept .the -narrow -view, ·_that · it had to -be a 
crimin~l offense. I was never at that ~oi~i; I do remember 
that I read a couple of rather long articles or books about 
the Johnson trial which were interesting, but I didn't think 
they would help us very much in 1974. I didn't go way into 
it in a real scholarly manner on the whole thing. I probably 
relied on~_gut 
0
reaction more than anything else and my own .. 
ba•sic- assessment of what the. Constitution: said ~ I just · didn't 
feel like we ought to be tied to the letter of the law on a 
criminal offense in this instance. Although, I felt like it 
had to be a highly significant offense, I didn't think it could 
be a non-criminal sort non-named sort of trespass on the 







the guts of the whole matter. I think of the Office of the 
Presidency governing of the country, it had to be an important 
significant offense. But it didn't necessarily have to be a 
criminal offense. Nor did I think any criminal offense would 
be necessarily an impeachable offense. In other words, you 
could have a criminal offense, it wouldn-'t be an impeachable 
offense, and you could have an impeachable offense and it . 
wouldn't be a criminal offense. Either one could be exclusive 
of the other. 
Involuntary manslaughter, for example . . 
Right, or running a red light, all kinds of things. Besides, 
I didn't think it had to be a criminal offense. I think in . 
the same vein,._ I don't know if this comes. U£_ anywher.e, I think. 
had a different to some extent view q_f our Coniinittee·'·s roles 
than some of the others. Some people looked qpon it as a grand 
jury that inquired on the prima facie sort of thing to indict 
or vote articles or a House extension. Our Committee's function 
was derivitative of the House and that's the position the House 
was in, I never felt that way. I felt that, and I said this 
publicly many times, that in order for me to vote as a member 
of the House of Representatives to impeach the President, I 
would have to be just as convinced of t h e evidence that was 
before me as I would require if I were a Senator to vote 
conviction. I didn't think that the degree of proof was any 
less required in the House than in the Senate. Any this was 
to the discredit of some people who used it as a crutch that 
they were going• to send it on to the Senate and let the 
Senate decide. That's a terrible way to shift the burden. 
The burden was on us and we couldn't pass it. · Now I realized 
all along that it would have been different in the Senate 
because the defendant, of course, the President, would be _ the 
impeachee, respondent and would have the opportunity to present 
evidence which was not necessarily the same manner in which 
you would present evidence if the House didn't inquire. The 
trial in the Senate would be different. You would have a 
better balance in the prosecution evidence and the defense 
evidence and that would make a different element before yo_u if 
you were a Senator as opposed to a House member. If you were 
a Senator and only had the evidence we had in the House, I 
would view it the same way as based on the evidence that was 
before me had I been a Senator voting to convict or a House 
member voting the articles of impeachment. I can remember. 
when I would tell some of the media coverage this was my view 
and they would give me some kind of hazy lpok; that wasn't 
exactly the way they wanted me to look at it you know. 
Throughout, I was impressed with and apprehensive of the fact 
that unanimously I think the people covering the inquiry wanted 
to see articles of impeachment voted. I can remember remarking 
on several occasions to the newsman at the stake out -- they all 
got to be friends of ours to some degree -- "Aren't any of you 
guys for Nixon?" I don't even think there was a cameraman that 








exactly where they were. They wanted to get the di r ty so-and-so 
and there was no balance to it in that respect. That further 
determined me not to be influenced by anything on the outside, 
I was insistent that there be fairness sho...,.,T. to him. And I said 
so on several occasions. And I said so during the public debate 
at one point, too. 
Did youhave a degree of belief concerning what you have before 
you, how much do you have to be convinced, that's clear and 
convincing, etc., the evidence? 
Well, I think clear and convincing became my standard as opposed 
to beyond a reasonable doubt and by the time we got to the publi, 
debate, John Doar had adopted that posture clearly. and, he 
didn't start out that way .at all.. · I think the Chairman's 
conception, staff conception, at least on the Democratic side 
of it .~as that we just make a prima fac ie case. I think they 
learned through the initial statements that was not going to 
satisfy enough of us to make it a legitimat e complaint. against 
the President. So, clear and convincing b e came more or less 
the standard in my mind, as I think it ultimately ended up in 
almost everybody's mind, except for s ome of them. Maybe it 
was their standard, too, but t hey w2re clearly and convincingly 
convinced at I thin~ :about. 1972. Yo u know, ~ight after the 
election. (LAUGHTER) 
Harper's quoted you as saying that you would be satisfied as 
"beyond a reasonable doubt." Now that shows you were changing 
in the next couple of months. 
Now I remember reading that article. I think they kind of 
pushed . my position at .that time. I don't think r· ever felt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. I'm not sure of that. But I'm 
still falling back ~n what I said that if I were a Senator 
I think I would be satisfied with clear and · convincing. -- · You 
know, when you say beyond a reasonable doubt, you almost rule 
out any circumstantial case and at the point we were at, even 
up to the disclosure on the June 23rd 1972 tape, we were 
dealing with circumstantial evidence and disclosure. That 
tape came after we were all finished. Some people could argue 
that we had direct evidence against the President, but they 
had pretty much taken all that, I think, and erased it. I 
think we were still dealing in circumstantial evidence up 
until after our inquiry. So, I think this was after I finally 
got it all together in my own mind. 
In your TV statement . that Thursday night, you said you'd vote 
on two things, evidence and the Constitution. Take this 
situation, . let's say the facts, the evidence was there, it was 
clearly against the Constitution, not a frivolous thing, but 
that thirdly, you were not convinced that the American people 
so apprehended, so understood it, would that third el~ment be 
necessary for impeachment in your mind? 
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WF - Yeah, probably. I thought that this was a part of the gyrnnasti 
that perhaps I went through during the public aspect of this 
thing. I thought that we had the responsibility after we had 
declared to bring the people along. I don't mean if there was 
going to be a trial, we should try the case in the public eye. 
You get a bend, a line there, of what would be appropriate and 
what would not be. I was still preparing to accept the challen~ 





I could have any influence upon that what we had 4one had been 
the right thing for the country. Because I was so totally 
convinced that we had to do it at that point. That was reached 
in a negative way that we would have been more wrong to fail 
to impeach than it was to impeach. You know the argument that 
the country can't stand i mpeachmen t; well , I think w.e are a 
pretty big country and we can stand almost anything. We had 
already been through a whole lot, and I' believe that we could 
suck it up for a little bit more and obviously we could. · But 
as I said it was not looking for the approval of my own 
constituency and it was apparently a mixed bag around the 
country and we'd just about as likely have bloodshed one way 
as the other, I guess. I didn't think it was the kind of · 
thing that was going to cause a revolution either way. The 
pros and cons were going both ways all over the country. 
In your statement, you put a lot of emphasis on Presidential 
truthfulness. In your mind, would you say that Presidential 
untruthfulness in itself is impeachable or is the substance 
of what he .is untruthful about? 
I think we've had a recent history of certainly more than the 
President being untruthful or denying the truth ot us, omission 
as much as commission. I think the degree of it was so 
appalling. The apparent total disregard of the truth, it was 
just what can we tell them ·that they might believe. "We don't 
have to worry about the truth, what can we tell them." It 
was so all-pervasive that it all elevated it to another level 
of transgression. Anyway, when you kind of shook it all down, 
it became obvious to me that you shouldn't even arrive at 
any kind of misleading or dealing outside of the truth between 
the President and the people. I'm really not so naive to think 
that there are periods in international history where you, we 
haven't gotten some lying, introduced some things that you know 
maybe they lead to prevarication. In terms of the kind of lies 
that the Nixon Administration would tell, it just became black 
and white, it was not even gray anymore. It was totally black 
and totally white. What they were doing was the deepest, 
darkest black. 
Well, let's move to something on not such_ a high level. Among 
your friends and family, for example, in the McCall's article 
on the wives of the seven members, they are quoting Mr.s. Flowers 
as saying that you brought your five-year-old to Washington. 
reah, he was five then, my youngest son. 
DFS -
WF 
/',,---· , , 




Right, and she was quoted as knowing that her husband, you, 
were going to go for impeachment. 
She didn't know a thing, because I didn't know it then. But 
she was up here and we were all at my apartment, which is just 
a couple of blocks away, during that time. I normally commute 
to Alabama and they stay down there but she ' ·s been up and back 
three or four times. We had one of our kids in camp, the 
seven-year-old, then the fifteen-year-old daughter, I don't 
know what she was up to; I guess she was staying with her 
grandmother in Tuscaloosa. So we just came up and they were 
visiting with friends around here and the thing had unfolde6 
with our private meetings and so on and I think that at some 
point during that period I came in and said, "Honey, I'm going 
to have to vote to impeach the President," -and thi..s was really 
just a couple of days before we went on public debates. I 
think that when we all faced up to it was that Tuesday morning. 
It was almost the same kind of electric atmosphere that morning 
that we had that Saturday night later on that week. It was 
less formal, we were a friendly kind of thing, we knew that we 
were dealing with matters of high importance and we kind of 
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Congressman Walter Flowers~ Alabama 
10· 
DFS 
- State allegiance here. A lot of my people moved up to 
Alabama Ave. (Laughter.) 
Mrs. Flowers, would you discuss the case or situation 
with her? Did she have any effect upon you? 
WF - I don't know that she did. I think she's a pretty con-
servative person, but she's never been pro-Nixon. She was 
follo"wing it very closely, and \'le talked about it considerably . 
but she could take what ever point of view it looked like 
I wanted her to take to discuss it and then we'd both 
re.pa i-r to: cur-- own cam e:rs for the next- di.scussi on - I might. 
be the Devil 1 s advocate on the other side and she knew 
that I was not going to declare and never really tried to 
influence me one way or the other. I know maybe Caldwell 1 s 
wife had a different point of view and they operated in a 
different manner. My wife was privy to my thinking on a 
day-to-day basis for the last 10 days or so, because she 
was up here and was aware of how. serious it was to me. 
It was that serious and it was obvious that I was thinking 
seriou_sly about goin9 for impeachment. 
DFS - What would be your reaction to our getting the seven 
wives together at a very infonnal sort pf thing at Hilton 
Head? 
WF - I think it would be very good. · She 1 s the one who suggested 
that I definitely ought to mention the primary and it is 
something that I really picked the thing up at a later date -
and in a quick reflection on it, it very definitely had 
an influence on my. The fact that I was to adamantly 
refusing to stake out a position until the very end was 
par.tly because of this primary race I had in early spring. 
So I think it would be good. 
DFS - Fine, were there any other people, outside the Congress 
now, that you were in communication with or influenced you? 
WF - No. As it got closer and closer to the final gun and the 
. possibility of voting for impeachment became a greater one 
for me, (I mean, we're political animals) and as I said 
I thought one of our obligations was to lead, and help other 
people at least legitimatize what we had to or might do. 
I talked with various people and I mean not only people 
you know I'd pick one person here and one person there, 
















WF - When I would see them on another occasion, I made damn 
sure that they understood that there was a distinct possfbility 
that I was going to vote for impeachment and I didn't want ,. 
it to be a complete shock to them and naturally the people 
that I talked to in this vein were people that I was fairl~ 
well certain were pro-Nixon at that point. I found a 
willingness amongst the reasonable ones, to listen and 
part of it I guess and I hope was confidence in me and 
my own thinking. Part of it was •·- I kind of though even 
at that stage which was backing up from the vote, oh anywhere 
from a couple weeks tomaybe a month before, it became 
obvious _that people hadn't r2a11y thought about it in terms. 
of· what damage might be- don-e to the Constituti,,on, to the 
system by this group, if we allowed it to go unchecked, 
the next group might even do it incompletely. · I can remember 
putting it to some of my conservative pro-Nixon constituents 
that you know this time the plumbers broke in Dr. Fielding's 
office to get information that they thought they could use 
against Elsberg and you don't like Elsberg, I know you don't 
But what if next time there was another regime in power 
and they were breaking in your Doctor's office to get 
information that they might use against you? You know 
people ' started thinking about it like· that. It did take on 
entirely different dimensions to them and it wasn't 11 let's 
get the dirty commies anymore, 11 it was ''.let's protect the 
system that protects me, just like it protects Dr. Fielding's 
records inviolate and Daniel Elsberg's civil rights. 11 It 
becomes an issue of principle rather than of person and 
that was the way that I was going to put it from then on 
to the people. 
DFS - Steve, do you want to go on to number six? 
SL. - Okay, I'd just like to cover one thing, we've covered about 
everything else in five -- threats against you and your 
family, did you receive threats at all during the inquiry? 
WF - We got a few obvious crank phone calls. I'll put it this 
way, Steve, nothing I every took seriously. We got some 
letters --
SL - What about your family in Alabama? 
WF - No, nothing, nothing. In fact people were exceedingly kind 
and thoughtful and didn't really seek us out to bother the 
family with it at all. All during this period I was in 
Alabama on the weekends. During the preceding couple of 
weeks I was not in the greatest of physical shape, but I 
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pneumennitous. Everytime I coughed, it just sounded like 
broken ribs, and the weather was so bad in terms of the 
air quality then and stuffy -- even if you'd been well -with 
the pressures that we were under, it would make you sick. · 
But I was sick. (laughs). I'd never been a nervous person~ 
I didn'tever get nervous or anything 1 ike that, but it 
did take its toll on my physically and I was a long time 
getting back to normal. I guess it was maybe on into 
the late fall before I ever felt decent again. I put it 
off a~ an ulcer~ in just a joking fashion to Cohen one 
day, and darned if he didn't use it in a statement that 
was on natfohal television. Walter Flowers has got an 
al'.'Cer. lt wasn't too bad. thounh _ .. _ 
------ ;IJ,I .,. 
DFS - You didn't like Waldie :'. - have a scotch during the 
proceedings, on TV? 
WF - No. 
DFS - He's supposed to have done that, you know. If you watch 
carefully, did you ever watch a replay of, say, Wednesday . 
night or Thursday night -- He would lean down occasionally 
and some people say come up looking much better than when 
he went down. 
MUCH LAUGHTER. 
WF - You know, of course, I was sitting right next to Jerry and 
we• ·ve b·een very friendly. I know it was very convenient 
for both of us to get out of the room, in the position 
that we were in, and I'd go outside just to keep stirring 
around rather than just sit there under the hot lights. 
They had a television on back there also. I would watch 
1t on te1evision for a while and come hack in and just stir 
around a little bit, rather than get stir crazy. He could 
have had something besides coffee in that coffee cup. ------
laugbter ------- I wouldn't want to say one way or the other. 
Given 'the right circumstances, I wouldn't turn it down. 
SL · - l~hat information or evidence did you consider either most 
helpful or most convincing? 
WF - You mean the mode of it or the specific~? 
SL - S~ccifics. 






Well, the March 21st tape. The evidence of the initial 
delivery of cash to Bittman, Hunt's iawyer, and then all 
that was wrapped up on that. Like the telephone calls and 
the fact of it, the manner of it which it was, \'/hen it was, 
you know, the whole bit. I thought that was helpful in the 
sense that it was devastating evidence. I guess the other 
thing that really remained with me as significant evidence 
and kind of capsulized it, is the arrogance and the abuse 
of power -- the manner in which Henry Peterson was used. 
And he was, his testimony made an impact in this regard • . 
Kalmbach's did too,' ·but to a lesser degree than did Peter-
son's. It was Peterson, a civil servant of the highest 
order. He had risen b.e,xond that \•Jhich you normally think 
a career person cfoes fn the: Justice Department and· it was 
on merit, a very impressive man and impeccable credentials 
and he had honestly been trying to do a good job in this 
respect, and he was torn, totally torn. I don't think that 
after the fact we could hardly put ourselves in the same 
position he was in during this period, when he was being 
used and abused by none other than the President of the 
United States. The fact of this really, was the most direct 
evidence of Nixon's abuse of power which would come under 
arti c) e two. The ferreting of information from Peterson 
by the Commander-in-Chief telling his lieutenant in the fray 
of battle, "you tell me. 11 Now, Peterson, had really no 
alternative but to tell the President. He told the President, 
and what did the President do as soon as Peterson left? --
he brought Haldman and Ehrlichman into the ante room and 
he spoon-fed them everything that Peterson had told him, 
not with a view towards -- 11 let 1 s straighten this out 
boyd, let's get it ship-shape" but it was a view towards 
patterning their defenses, getting their stories in a way 
that would sell. This was a sticky si:t;uation to me, and 
I just couldn't get away from thinking about it. I had been 
one of the larger proponents of taking more as opposed to 
less live testimony. I remember when the initial decisions : 
were being made as to who would be interviewed, I was shocked · 
that they were talking about personal testimony, from I 
think about five witnesses. I said you mean we're going to 
go to bat on this thing without having Chuck Colson in 
person? And Colson kind of got to be an issue because of 
the principle of the thing to me, and I said 11you know we 
got to have Colson, 11 but the Republican side proposed 10 or 12 
guys, some of whom didn't seem really necessary to me but 
because of the Colson thing, I stuck with the larger number 













patience, his attempt to conciliate to Brooks and some of 
them. They thought they were giving me and Jim Mann and 
Thornton maybe everything, although I don't think Thornton 
really asserted himself as much as Jim and I did. Majbe 
Jim did as much as I did, 'cause Brooks laughed about it -
he is such a funny guy anyway. He said, "you just let 
Flowers have everything he wants, there ain't nothing he 
can do anyway." I was adamant about Colson. A couple of 
others I thought we ought to insist on were Ehrlichman and 
Hal deman. I t hink we could have ulti mately got t hem but 
no body seemed i ns i stent on that . I j us t coul dn 't generate 
any support for t hat. I th i rrk t hey ulti lilately would have 
come although they had sent word they didn't want to because 
of their trials coming up and all that. But this really 
wasn't doing anything with the most important issue of all 
and to think we were going to just rely on evidence that 
had been deduced in another tribunal, where the issues 
were different, the people were different. What we were 
relying on mostly was the Senate's word and I'm still 
disappointed in the investigative job t hat our side did. 
I t hink they did a fantastic job compiling, of putting it 
together, of timing, they must have a sixth sense about it 
because they let us have just enough~to keep us satisfied. 
But I don't think we did enough spade work on our own and 
had we done more , I think maybe we could have made a case 
out under article five. The tax money article. I think · 
we could have done some more because we had a great wealth of 
infonnation and material that had been accumulated by all 
these people, intluding Woodward and Bernstein and every-
body else. We didn't really do anything but compute it, 
more or 1 ess. 
TM - You had some Grand ~ury testimony --
WF - And we had some other stuff. But it was other people's 
investigative work, wasn't it Tom? 
TM - All of it, I don't remember any original 
WF - They interviewed a few people that I might have, but it was 
the new stuff was the grand jury stuff, wasn't it, that's all 
it was. All the stuff that came from the various departments 
was confidential or secret. 
, ' DFS - An interesting little footnote here is Lattimer Pringle 















WF - Is that right? 
DFS - Pure coincidence. 
WF - Is that right? 
LAUGHTER 
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DFS - Anything else about this general area of information, of 
evidence? 
SL - Just the ta pes -- Do you thin k they could have built a 
clear and convincing case if there had been no tapes? 
WF - If there hadn't been the tapes, I think it could have been 
done possibly but it would have required far more investigative 
work than we did and I can't say that we wouldn't have done 
it. But the tapes were such a key part of it. It just is 
hard to imagine something taking the place of the March 21st 
tape or the tape that really developed the interplay with 
Peterson. Everything that becomes really important centered 
around the tapes. The transcripts -- we only got them 
because there was the tapes. You wouldn't have ever had 
the transcripts to go with if you hadn't had the tapes. 
TM - Was it necessary to :listen to them, do you think? Was that 
important? As opposed to reading them? 
WF - I think you could have gotten it in a transcript. I think 
listening to them put an entirely different dimension to 
it. In some respects it made it lighter on the President 
and in some respects it \'tas more of a devastating blow. 
The tone, you got a real feel for these guys sitting around 
in the room and their feet up on the desks and they were 
just kind of talking, you know. Early on you kind of had 
. the feeling, at least I did, that Nixon was just a front 
man for Haldeman, that Haldeman was in charge. Anytime 
the subject changed it was Haldeman that led the discussion 
over into another area. It was Haldeman that talked in 
short sentences to the point, made the point, and then 
went on to something else. He'd sum it up. Nixon was 
indecisive, Haldeman was decisive. It became more 
obvious later on that they almost acged as one. They 
became almost a part of each other and when one acted, it 
was certainly not just with acquiescence, but with full 
knowledge and al most in concert, one with another. But 
you had a different fe el, someti mes, it seemed to help the 
President's position t hat t here was this conversation tone 
and at other times you got a real feeling for the kind of 
- ~·-::~"O"l!"'lr-?"~i--'~~ .:e ...... -..-.. -~··,-... . - ,-•- •. ~- .. 
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WF - arrogance though. This is where it 1 s at and these other 
guys are 1 esser persons that i·1e don I t need to consider. 11 
It didn 1 t help them. The tapes themselves or the material 
that was on the tapes were of great importance in the final 
out come. I'm almost inclined to say that it would have 
never occurred without them. And I think probably that's 
the case. 
SL - What was your reaction to St. Clair's performance? 
WF - i-111, I kept \•Jaiting for hi m to do something significant. 
Here's this guy with fabulous credentials of a trial lawyer 
and he sat over there like he knew something that we didn't 
know. We were all getting more and more bored with Dear 
and Jenner and the data data da that --- I don't like 
long jokes, or shaggy dog stories, man I just want somebody 
to get to the point. I like, sometimes I pick up a book 
and I read the last chapter first. I get kidded by everybody 
for reading Time and Newsweek from the back - forward, 
you know I just want to get into .the ·issue, and then I'll 
unveil the other stuff. We just went through the shaggiest 
of shaggy dog stories on the thing and we kept wondering 
.,.,hen are they going to tie this thing t ogether. It was 
worrisome, it rea11y was. We kept thinking now, St~ 1 
Clair's to be different, he's going to ream them a new) 
one. (laughter) - I think that maybe it was the most dis-
appointing final act that I've ever seen. There was never 
anything really substantive that he proposed or suggested 
or put forw'lard. Never anything that gave a new twist to it. - · 
At least to me. This was one thing that I think turned 
the tide. Here is obviously a talented guy who'd been 
hired to defend the President and you can't change the 
facts. He didn't have the facts on his side. The best 
of lawyers can do no better than the facts given them in 
the case to argue. It was obvious that he was not getting 
full disclosure from his client. The last go he had at 
us when he disclosed something that had never been brought 
out before - it was a --
SL - Partial transcript-------
Wf - Part of a transcri pt, yes. I thought it was a real bad 
show. I couldn't believe that they guy was doing it. 
Plus it didn't help. Number one, here was a lawyer dealing 
with 1 a\'tyers and you know you don I t say you don I t have some-
thing to start off with and find it at the last minute after 
the other guy doesn't have a chance to dispute it. It is 
suspect. It was suspect. It set him back, if he had made 
' l.. 
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WF - any progress in his presentation he was set back and then 
some by that low blow, I'd call it. Additionally, it 
didn't help at all. The substance of it, if you could 
even look away from the manner in which it was presented, 
it was no good. It became obvious later that the President 
had insisted that he do that. But he had objected, to doing 
it. Mr. Mixon said, 11 Now you do it! ! 11 It's kind of like · 
he told Peterson, "You tell me!! 11 You knm·1 he had no 
choice. I think St. Clair was broken by the case pretty 
much. It was kind of pitiful in looking back at the final 
analysis. Here was a guy, a great la\•tyer, at least supposed 
to be, and he goes to handle the President's defense and 
there had really been no defense. I don't think that there 
had been a case put forward at all. ,, 
DFS - In your opinion, it was Cates that was able to make it a 
little less shaggy doggish somehow? 
WF - Yead, Cates! Cates was extremely helpful. But nature 
everybody liked him, he's kind of swashbuckling, a big 
handsome guy, a trial lawyer, the facts man, the actionable 
facts is what he does not the shaggy dog part of it and 
I think he assisted a lot of people. I didn't spend a lot 
of time with him, but he was there if you wanted to bite 
something off him. We had good access to him, real quick. 
He was always available, I think that was a very important 
ingredient in any staff work. 
DFS - On the 28th of June, two important things. -- Rodino' s 
supposed to have made that statement to the Los Angeles 
Times, that all the Democrats are going to vote for impeach-
ment. And the other, at the Caucus that morning, I believe, 
you and Mann and Thornton indicated and I think Jordan, too, 
that you just weren't certain whether a case had at that 
point been made and evidently Rodino was surprised at that. 
By the fact that you were just not convinced. What were 
your relations with Rodino during that time? 
WF - Very good! He might have made the statement. I know 
Sam Donaldson and I know Jack Nelson and they are honorable 
guys and great reporters and Rodino is like the rest of us. 
he could get carried a\-Jay and say -- 11 1 just know all the 
Democrats are going to vote for impeachment." The manner 
in \-Jnich he said it would probably be more 11 I hope that 
they are going to vote for it. 11 I can I t help but feel that 
no matter what his choice of words ,might have been, that 
would have been the way that he intended it because at 















sure of that, because I'd had a number of private discussions 
with him. He and I have been quite friendly since I served on 
his subcommittee, when he was subcommittee chairman ·and we worked 
together very closely. I just, I didn't want him to be surprised 
by my point of view either. Just like I was not going to let 
my constituents cast my vote, I was not going to let my Chairman 
cast my vote either. That's why at every point in Caucus or in 
private discussions with him or anybody else, each time they'd 
get this group therapy of "let's bring everybody along" by the 
time we got to the end of the session, Flowers woul~ say, 
"Now I want you guys to know that I've got an open mind about 
this entire thing and I don't know how I'm going t~ end up." 
That very day that this was supposed to have happened I had 
been talking in terms that I didn't think that a case had been 
made at that point. Jim and Ray and I, and to a lesser extent 
Barbara, had chimed in somewhat in frustration that the slow 
movement of the staff work didn't point in a really clear 
direction at that point. We didn't think that they'd really 
gotten us anywhere. All we had was generally in the public 
domain and we hadn't really improved upon it -- no investi-
gative work of our own. I think I was disappointed in that 
· at that point. I remember ~hen this hit the wire, and the great 
furor that was caused by it. Rodino was looking for me. He 
wanted me. He was going to make a speech on the House Floor 
and he wanted Flowers to be over there to agree that he hadn't 
said that. I didn't know whether he had said it or not but I 
knew that if he had said it, it wasn't a fact because he didn't 
have my vote. I could certainly say that and so I had said 
something like that, but I said, Mr. Chairman, I have got to 
go to Alabama and I was gone to meet a two o'clock flight at 
the time that he took to the House Floor to make a little 
short speech that the reports were not true. 
Didn't you say that you denied it all the way to Alabama and 
back? 
I told him that and then he said that I said that. (LAUGHTER) 
What I denied all the way to Alabama and back was that he had 
my vote in his hip pocket. (MORE LAUGHTER) 
Another thing about the Committee business -- leaks. Now in 
your opening statement on TV you said that they were great, 
grossly over-emphasized. Is that your general view? 
Yes. I don't think that there was anything that was leaked 
that really made a difference. It was unfortunate because 
obviously a couple of people were using this to get a little 
publicity. They enjoyed the sneaky conversation here and there 
and most of us were trying to be straight about it and it case 
the Committee in somewhat of a bad light. It gave those who 
wanted to detract something to use as an example. You know, 
occasionally when somebody wanted to appear to be fair to Nixon, 
they'd criticize the Committee for the leaks. The leaks didn't 
really matter, I don't think, one way or the other. That's what 








I had difficulty in trying to make notes and put the thing 
together myself from my recollection. With regard to the 
Coalition, going back before the Tuesday when the Coalition 
actually met, your earliest recollection of this type of 
thing developing? Maybe even discussing it with somebody? 
Tom~ I couldn't put a date on it. You know Rails and I have 
always been good friends, going back a couple of years. We've 
been together on trips, we've played ball together, played 
paddle ball together, you know, kind of "just knocked around 
together a little bit. I was also closest on our side to 
Jim Mann probably because we came to Congress together at the 
same time. We'd discuss the thing, as we have a lot of things 
that would emerge in the Commit tee. We could help each other 
where it wouldn't do us any good to kalk to Conyers, or Waldie, 
or Kastenmeier, not that, they don't react the same way that 
we might to various issued. I think earlier that we had had 
just a sort of tacit understanding that Jim and I -- that at 
some point we were going to get together and make our decisions 
but until we got to that point it was kind of fruitless to try 
to narrow the issues until all the issues were laid out. And 
it was the same way in talking with Tom and I think King. 
Cohen had a friendship that enabled a discretion there. Caldwel. 
and Ham came into it, just sort of drifted in somehow or 
another. It was kind of hard to say the others were not a 
part of our group but they weren't, it was just the seven of 
us. In talking to Jim, it was always just assumed that we'd 
talk to Ray,- too, because I knew Ray geographically, politi cally , 
He had the same basic situation that Mann and I would have and 
he was a moderate, independent, liberal, conservative Democrat. 
You know he could end up doing what everybody else would based 
on the issue. He was independent. Jim was, too. And that's 
where I view myself. It was inevitable that we ultimately 
coalese. We were forced to just like everything else around 
here by the time element. Our timing was forced upon us. 
You deal in deadlines, you know, you get an assignment and you 
prepare it right. You get it finished right before you get 
it don't you? (LAUGHTER) 
Well, maybe you don't. 
Well, that's right. Or as you are getting it, I remember one 
of those statements I made over there. I was reading the first 
paragraph and writing the last one. It's all you've got but 
we had a Democratic Caucus on Monday evening before our Tuesday 
morning meeting and they were all trying to have one of these 
group therapy sessions. "We're going to do this, aren't we? " 
I didn't declare. I said that "I'm not ready to but I think 
we ought to get together, oughtn't we, Jim and Ray?" And so, 
we left the Caucus over in Rayburn and went over to Jim Mann's 
office and this was 10 o'clock Monday night. 
(_ 
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TM - Were you aware at that time of the meeting the following-
morning to take place in Railsback's office? 
WF - Yes . - --Torn and I had made that -- we had already made that sort 
of proposition that we would have that meeting the next morning 
TM - That was on Monday morning or afternoon? 
WF - That was sometime during the day Monday. We said Monday 
afternoon probably, "why don't we get together early tomorrow 
morning in your office. We've got a Caucus tonight and I'll 
talk with Thornton and Mann and we'll get together early 
tomorrow morning." We didn't have a whole lot .of time left. 






just sat around with no notes or anything else and we basically 
had the same kind of three-way disc~ssion that the next morning 
turned into a seven-way discussion. Or eight or nine-way 
discussion. We came basically to the issue that we thought 
that the evidence was there. It was sufficient. We had some 
concerns, we had some reservations, but besically were prepared 
to vote for impeachment. We had put it together right. We 
were all planning to go to the meeting the next morning, which 
we did. That next morning was the key coalesing of the Coalitio 
It was Tuesday morning, I think. 
Was there any strategy worked out among the three of you as to 
how you would approach that mee~ing on Tuesday morning? 
Not really. _ It was subject to the personal, subjective feelings 
We had come together totally independently. I don't think any 
way that anybody could have said -- "well, I'm gonna be in 
charge and do this". It was really like acting as one because 
of a single interest. These kind of things don't happen around 
here much. It was very, very unique that way. I don't believe 
that there was any strategy amongst the others either. 
Not that I know ·of. 
Was there any cause and effect, would you say, between the 
fact that the Dear articles came out on the preceeding Friday? 
There had been all sorts of articles. Brooks had circulated 
some articles. There was talk the Coalition came together as 
a response to the articles which were unsatisfactory to us. 
I think that's totally overrated in my judgment. There was a 
whole lot of discussion that what we wanted to get were articles 
that would, you know, soft-soap the thing. And, well, that's 
exactly the opposite. We were interested in narrowing the thing 
to what was the strongest possible proof. But like I said one 
time, it's got to be a God-awful offense for me to vote for 
impeachment. And I don't want to just cuff him on the wrist, 
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Because I have got to tell my people that this was significant 
enough for me to vote to impeach the President of the United 
States. You don't do it for a traffic ticket. We wanted to 
put it in language that would be suitable. We just wanted to 
narrow the scope down to what we thought was provable and not 
be scattered all over the ball park with somewhat tenuous 
proof. We wanted it to be strong. But we wanted to be 
shootting with a rifle and not with a shotgun. 
Would you look at the meetings? You were at the early meetings. 
That's my recollection, you were always there it seemed to me. 
But there were others that I'm really not sure of. 
The first meeting, Tom, I think we were all there. There was 
another meeting that I know that Ray Thornton said he was not 
present at, I don't know whether it was the next morning or what. 
Tuesday morning I would call a meeting on substance, very much 
so. The next coupld of meetings we had were on form. On the 
form of the articles. Of crossing the t's and dotting the i's. 
It's just like I said, "that to me was really not the most 
important part." Maybe it's because I'm not really interested 
in pleading. I've often said to people when they say you 
practice law, and I say, "sometimes, mostly I practice the 
facts." I had a professor who said that, insisted on saying 
"now as to the facts of the law arises," and I think I took 
that .to heart more than anything else. The facts were the most 
important thing here, and that's why I say the pleading, the 
articles had to reflect the provable facts and to me it was 
less important pow we stated it. As for the fact, we stuck with 
what we really had him by. Not, let's don't hang him by a 
string when we can hang him by a cable . . I think Wednesday was 
more devoted to how we wanted to draft the articles. I was more 
passive in that than I was in the facts and than how we were 
going to present the case. The meetings at the Capitol Hill 
Club became strategy on the. presentation of the case. I 
remember particularly the Friday evening when I think we were 
at an important junction there because we were concerned that 
we were not looking good at that point. 
The Sarbanes substitute, which was your draft of article one, 
was introduced Friday morning at 11:30 or thereabouts. 
I thought we were really bad, we lost on Friday. 
Sandman and Wiggins -- they were pessimists. 
We were losing and we were discouraged. This is where -- to 
my mind or attitude at that point -- was we'd been spinning 
around here and we'd been letting these guys that are really 
not, you know, Sarbanes, and Donohue and these guys, that really 
weren't making the case. They were not going to put it over 
to the American people because the American people identified 
with those of us in the middle. I just was so conscious of 
this that I felt that the independence of the seven of us, 








that Mr. and Mrs. Average American were looking to to lead them 
and we couldn't put that burden off on Paul Sarbanes. He was 
for impeachment all along. I may have said this to somebody, 
I recollect it anyway, "If we are going to impeach the President 
of the United States, we are going to have to do a good, clean 
job of it, and it's time we took over." That led to my decision 
to make the subparagraph motions to strike if Sandman had not 
done it. Now this was on Friday evening. The Thursday night 
meeting that we put together over to the Capitol Hill Club, 
I can remember that one too. I know how nervous Tom was at 
that point because he was going to have to make his presentation 
later on that evening. His initial presentation. I don't think 
he had really thought through completely what he was going to 
say. He was very nervous about it. I know at that point, I 
didn't know what I was going to say and I was nervous for him 
because my time was going to come the next morning at some time 
and I didn't know what the dickens I was · going to say. Mine 
was put together in final form right before I made it, that 
was it. I worked most of the night and I know, my little boy, 
the five-year-old, (he's six now,) he was -- you know how kids 
can kind of have a feel for what's happening -- he was awake, 
too. He was sleeping on the floor. I had a very small apartment 
and he was sleeping on the floor there in the little living 
room. Every now and then he'd come in and he and I were talking 
back and forth, all night long, but my wife was fast asleep. 
I was just formulating in my own mind the train of thought, 
and I came over real early in the morning, Friday morning and 
drafted it in longhand. I wish I had it now but I don't know 
what happened to it. I threw it away, if I'd saved it it'd 
be worth more to me than anything. I did it in longhand, 
crossing and stuff, just like Abe! (LAUGHTER) 
I was just going to ask about Sarbanes, for example. How did 
it happen that he and Hungate, who you said were already pretty 
much committed or very much·, why were they chosen? Why didn't 
a man like yourself or say Mann, someone who had the independent 
image, the middleground image, --
Well, we talked about it. It was that I think that we still 
wanted to retain that image until you got the article over with. 
I was not prepared to move the adoption of the article because 
at that point I was not prepared to indicate my favor of the 
article. To some extent we were playing games but they were 
very important games. You know, we almost had a serious flap 
over when we were going to vote. we didn't almost -- we did! 
We had a very serious collision over when the vote was going 
to be taken. Didn't quite get to the name calling stage, but 
it darn near did. 
Was that the Kastenmeier resolution? 
That's right. Which was a real frustration to me. It. was 
because a few of them thought that I was going too far or that 







The reason that I was so insistent, and I thought I had Rodino 
and everybody's agreement to put off the vote until the final 
thing. Jim and I had more or less made that commitment to the 
Republicans. We could avoid a vote until after the final thing. 
You know, we could have one big gusto, instead of a whole lot 
of smaller ones. I remember in that first meeting where we 
got at the issue in Tom's office that Tuesday morning. I'm 
the one that broached it, I said, "you know, we're talking 
about form and what kind of articles. Gentleman, I think the 
issue is whether we're willing to vote to impeach the President. 
That is what we are talking about, isn't it?" Everybody kind of 
looked around for somebody to say something first and old Caldwel 
_r did. He said "Yeah, that's right." I said, "Butle.r do you 
1 realize that every pick-up truck in Roadnoke can be up here 
( within three hours after you do it, the same day~ It kind of 
injected a little levity in it, because. I think we· were all 
concerned about the pick-up trucks b~ing representative of 
the Middle American that we wanted to be with us, not that we 
were thinking about votes in the next election. We wanted them 
to be with us because it was important for the country. And 
Caldwell said that yes he realized that. The rest of us were 
more than one day's drive away. -
We want to move to the actual day of the meeting. Would you 
comment briefly on the initial moment of that Tuesday morning 
meeting when we got into the room and closed the door and for 
the first time there were seven Members of Congress looking at 
each other? · · 
WF - Well, we didn'·t'really know where to start. Everybody had their 
little testimonial business, sort of. I'm not sure that every-
body did. We just kind of went around the table and different 
people said what was troubling them and I think we all knew 
that we were all troubled by the same thing. We didn't operate 
in a vacuum. We were together day in and day out, for weeks 
and weeks, and weeks. We went to quorum calls together, 
various people at various times. We walked to our offices 
together. We all knew that we were troubled but we were not 
committed one way or another. We knew who had declared and who 
had not. I think it was inevitable that we come together at 
some point and that there weren't many points left. It was a 
relief to all of us that we virtually excluded the same 
things and we had included the same things. We were all 
- basically concerned about the same two things. And that was 
the actual cover-up and the abuse of power. At some point, 
maybe it was the next day, we thought seriously about could it 
maybe all be put under one all-encompassing article of impeach-
ment. It's my judgment that it could have been. And it all 
could have been included under article two, with article one 
just being a very major subheading under article two. But I 
think it was, looking back, it is well that we did it the way 
that we did. 
~:... - TM -, - But at some point, a question arose at that time, "How the . Senate 
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But at some point, a question arose at that time, "How the 
Senate would vote on that kind of article?" Whether it was 
several, even before the House, whether it could be several 
on the Floor, and certain parts voted for. 
I'm certain that played a part in our final decision, of 
course. We talked around a little bit. At times we'd think 
the House would and we didn't know. I think we had pretty well 
determined that if our group did not vote to impeach, that the 
House would not impeach. But at that point, I was not sure 
that if we did vote to impeach that the House would vote to 
impeach. After the public aspect of the thing and after the 
three articles were voted, and after the kind of reception 
that we received at the hands of the rest of the Members of 
the House, it became publicly obvious that the House was going 
to follow our lead. There would be . no dissent. It started, 
it didn't take them long to come around either. I think that 
based upon just the evidence that we had there, that by the 
time the President resigned, that he would have been convicted 
in the Senate, too. 
Within the Coalition, did what turned out to be article three 
play a role? 
For various reasons we were, I think, against article three. 
I thought it was just unnecessary over-kill. TacitlYi for 
one thing, technically I thought it could have been an article 
of impeachment, but I didn't think we'd ever elevate it to that 
point by either citing him for contempt or having the House 
authorize the issuance of the subpoena. There were a couple 
of things that we could have done and gone forward on that .would 
have made article three in my judgment a viable article of 
impeachment. But it wasn't a real major matter . to us and I 
think all of us voted against it, didn't we? 
No, Thornton voted in favor -of it; he was the only one. 
Thornton did, well we talked about it because I remember we 
talked about it with Thornton. He was sort of either way on 
it, and finally came down on the side of it, as voting for 
impeachment on it. Oh, well Hogan voted on that one, too, 
didn't he? 
Yes, 
He did. But he was johnny-come-lately to our considerations. 
Comment just briefly on that Friday night meeting at the 
Capitol Hill Club, the atmosphere. 
Well, it was frustration. We all, you know, we deal in reactions 
and whether you're there or not I perceived we were losing the 
battle of the hearts and minds of the people at that point. 
I think we all felt that way. Some of them wanted to hurry up 
and get it, Tom wanted to get it over with. That's what he 
C. 
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WF - wanted to do. He had renched, spilled his guts already. I 
think he wanted to get it over with. I think the others felt 
the same way, maybe as much as I did or maybe less, I don't know . 
But it was my perception then that we had an opportunity then 
that we'd never have again. To bring the people along, because 
the audience was there. The American people were watching the 
thing and they were glued to it. We'd never recapture that 
again, and if we lost them, we might not ever get them back. 
We were losing. We had the vote, we were going to vote to 
impeach the President, we were all committed at that point, 
there was no possibility of that falling by the wayside. But 
the specificators on the other side had licked us on Friday. 
TM - Do you recall the options that were discussed -- of filliii'g · in 








Yes. We decided that it'd be better to talk of offering eroof 
under the articles as drawn as opposed to that. Froehlich 
was one. He wa~_ ~ver w~th us that night, don't you remember?( t 
I don't think he understands how he ended up voting for 
impeachment himself. I think he just blurted it out. We 
were all surprised when he . showed up. 
So was his District. 
Do you recall the next following day you developed a strategy 
of motions to strike? 
He talked about·that before you came in. 
JVf' '-1f 
\ 
Did you develop that at that meeting at the Capitol Hill Club? 
Yes, that's when it looked to me that that was the way to do 
it. We didn't have any other really parlimentary method of 
getting the floor. We had all used up our five minutes on the 
article and in addition to our other general debate time and 






Would you comment on the Democrats that were looking at the 
articles as they were being drafted? 
. Oh, Conyers, Brooks, Edwards. 
We don't really know who they are. 
Yes, well, there is very little I can help you with there. My 
dealings on the articles were generally with Jim. Occasionally 
in a Caucus with the others we'd talk about it a little bit but 
there had been some people kind of kid-gloving it then because 
we had had a near explosion over the manner in which the vote 
was going to be taken. There was some frayed tempers there and 
several of them were giving me a very wide berth. It was a 








Kastenmeier still is not sure that I am not mad at him, which 
I'm not. I think a couple of them thought that I was going to 
let that change my position on the final vote, which, as I said 
before, it was too important to let the people decide. I 
certainly was not going to react to a disappointment and let 
that change the manner in which I was determined to vote at 
that point. I think that they were wrong to go back on their 
commitment in open meeting. I mean you just don't operate that 
way around here and shouldn't anywhere else. I don't think 
in the final analysis that it made any difference, but it 
could have worked adversely to the political interests of the 
members who were in the middle. It could again I was thinking 
in terms of the audience and we were on public television and 
we had everybody and my concern was that if we voted this . 
thing piecemeal after the ·initial vote that we'd lose it. 
We'd lose the attention of the audience, and I think we did 
pretty much. The crucial time was over Saturday night. 
Nobody remembers what · was said Monday. 
How about the famous and argued-about adjective "fragile"? 
Do you think that has any validity? The fragile Coalition? 
No, we were united by spirit and we weren't paper thin. I 
think we allowed the others to think that. Because you let 
somebody think you are having a hard time making up your mind 
and they bend over backwards to keep you with them. They thought 
that our Coalition required accommodation, so they are going 
to accommodate us because they all knew that they had to have 
us. We knew that they had to have us and they knew that they 
had to have us. We were in the driver's seat. We really .were. 
I don't think we took unfair advantage. But there wasn't a 
whole lot of compromises that we needed to make. Because we 
could vote with those other guys on anything and have a majority, 
as long as we stuck together. 
How about your own personal reaction on that Saturday night · 
after the final vote on the first article? 
I was personally more drained physically and emotionally than 
I've ever been. It had been.the most trying experience of my 
life. That day had been a tough one for me because when I 
had decided that it was getting screwed up and I was, for 
better or for worse, going to take charge as best I could 
within the framework of what I had at my disposal and that 
was the motion to strike. And this went on all day long and 
I was kind of in the hot-box. I don't yet know how I did it, 
but I got Rodino to let me talk for 5 minutes, at the last 
minute. Brooks kidded me a lot about that, too. I was very 
emotional at that time and when I walked out of the room after 
we had voted and Rodino and I met in the back hall inside the 
Committee chambers and I tried to say something to him and he 
tired to speak to me and nothing would come out. I just 
couldn't, you know, I didn't know what I was going to say 




WF - If I'd had anything on my stomach, I'd just thrown it up, I 
think. I just had to hold back, you're just so emotional that 
it's like it'd be after the death of a close friend. We were 
all teary-eyed and I couldn't talk to anybody; I just had to 
come in here and shut the door. My staff was out there and 
the phone started ringing off the wall and I just said, you 
know. I just came in and shut the door and they knew that I 
couldn't be bothered and they didn't. Fifteen or twenty 





of let it all cool off for a few minutes before I 'could even 
discuss it with anybody. Then I took a few telephone calls 
and I talked to the office and how we were going to handle it 
and go on. It wasn't political until that point. From that 
point on it was, . "Let's figure how we are not going. to get · 
burned in the next eJection ba,sed upon this." It was still 
what are you going to do tomorrow, too, that sort of thing. 
We had already gone back to meeting the next morning on 
article two, Sunday morning. It was a very, very emotional 
experience. I think for everybody, even those that had never 
thought doing anything but voting for impeachment. I think 
even they were filled with 'the emotion of the moment. The 
air that Cammi ttee .. room was filled with Saturday night was 
as thick as ocean water is normally. 
Someone had made the cynical comment that he thought that some 
of those who for a long time were in favor of impeachment were 
acting that Saturday night, that this was a truly difficult 
thing for them to do. Did you notice that kind of reaction? 
I don't know. I wouldn't impute that to anybody. I can think 
of the persons that they would be thinking about because they 
did put on what you could say was a pretty good how. I know 
how emotional I was and I'm not going to charge them with having 
any lesspotential for feeling, although they were certain. I 
mean, I was certain how they were all going to vote, arid I'm 
sure they were too, in all honesty with themselves. · There were 
some pretty drawn . faces that had not been drawn before. I 
don't know if I ought to allow that to stay in there. 
As a result of everything, do you think that future generations 
now have a clearer definition of an impeachable offense? 
Gee, I don't know. I think they, yeah, yeah. I think that 
they also have the red-eyed law that you can't really define 
it. I mean they have a clear knowledge of it, if not a 
definition. They have a clear knowledge that it's got to 
respond to the facts. And I think that's the way it ought to 
be, I wouldn't try to give a hornbook definition. It's got 
to be case law. It's got to fit the facts and that's the way 
it worked in this instance. Like I said, that 200 year old law 
was sufficient to the task and it measured up in 1974. So I 
think that future g~nerations have a method of operation that 
I think will be invaluable. I think the Committee's work in 
terms of how do you move from here to there is a model to go by, 







work, all kinds of things that ought to be helpful should 
anything like this ever arise in the future. You're going 
to have to rely on whose sitting in those chairs in the future 
just as much as it just happened that it turned out well this 
time. You know, our Committee was .unique in a sense and the 
fact that we were all lawyers and such a wonderous cross-section; 
you know, you had the feel that looking at it blacks, ethnics, 
WASPS, you know you had it all, just a beautiful, beautiful 
cross-section of America and what really had gone into making 
this country unique in the whole world and they were wrestling 
together as hopefully the founding fathers wrestled together 
just as diligently as we did. I like to think that they did. 
It's got to be a model in the future. But still it's going 
to come down to what the people just like I think what's an 
impeachable offense. They are going to have to see what the 
facts are. 
What do you think are some of the beneficial effects of the 
whole process? 
You know, I hate to think the troubles that we've had subsequent 
to it -- you know, economics, foreign policy defeat, other 
adverse things on the American scene, had they come along 
without the intervention of our Committee's performance in 
front of the American people, it might have really caused 
some changes, or looking elsehwere than to our system. It 
might have caused some people to get turned off that hung in 
there, I think, because their faith was renewed and restored 
by what they saw accomplished in the summer of 74. I think 
that's probably .the best thing to come out of it. And we kind 
of in a sense turned the clock back to old traditional values 
of right and wrong. Yes, Virginia, there is right· and wrong. 
It was very timely, very timely. I think young and old alike, 
and some people say the young people had renewed faith, I think 
the old people, too. That the broad cross-section of America 
got a renewed confidence in government that can be responsive, 
can be responsible because of what we did. Now to some extent 
it goes up and it goes down, Congress had a great rating after 
that, in the Gallup and Harris polls, and now it's back down 
again. But you know that's politics. You can't go anywhere 
now that they don't remember. I get recognized places I ought 
not to get recognized, on an airplane somewhere, people say, 
hey, don't I know you from somewhere, and I never tell them 
where they might know me from but they sometimes figure it out 
and sometimes don't. People have a good recollection about it, 
I mean they remember it good, whether they remember something 
I did or whether their favorite guy was Chuck Wiggins or many 
of their favorite guy was Charlie Sandman. It all comes out 
good. Even if they supported Nixon, they remember the hero 









It has been said that up to that time the White House, not just 
the President, the White House had become a virtual fourth branch 
of government, responsible not to the people, the iaw, but to 
itself. Do you think that's an extreme statement or would you 
say .it's substantially accurate? 
I think it has a whole lot of truth to it. I think that what 
happened in our Committee last summer went a long way towards 
restoring a balance of power between the legislative and executiv 
brc•.nches. I think I had something to say about that at the 
time. Tha~ you know what we did with that power was going to 
be up to us, we might fumble the ball and I think we have not 
used it very well and _ that we've still got the opport_unity ~ .. 
use it. P"art of this is· because Gerald Fbrd' s natural desire· 
and propensity to let the legislative/ branch be more of a 
leader . . But the~e is no question about what we did knocked 
the executive down a notch or two, maybe more than that. 
That was, of course, last August, 10 month s ago, and by this 
May you made the decision to tape your recollections, which 
of course we're doing. What were the factors that caused you 
to say, yes, now, that might not have made you willing last 
August or October? Is there a difference? Would you have been 
more reluctant to do this last October than now? 
I don't think so, I would have been receptive to it then, just 
as now. It would probably have a more even recollection of it, 
although we may miss some of the specifics of it now. It's 
probably less subjective now, maybe more objective although we 
lose some of the specific hindsight that we would -have had 
earlier on. But I would have been receptive to it at any point. 
It's just a question of available time and thanks to you fellows 
help putting it all together. I think it's good that we do 
this. I hope that it will be worthwhile to somebody along 
the line; 
I have one final question. Would you comment on the treatment 
the inquiry received by the media. I think you began your 
opening statement making a few comments about that. 
As I said, I think that everybody was against Nixon, but I 
think that the media had its finest hour in terms of the 
investigative reporting, Woodward and Bernstein are darn good 
examples of it, although they violated a whole lot of ethical 
rules of the profession, but their diligence and their 
perseverance paid off. Because without them, I don't know 
what would have turned up. All of these pressures kept 
things turning up that it ultimately ended that what we had 
what we did. They hung in there, they were i~terested. I 







They were anxious to know why I thought they were being unfair 
to Nixon. It was a very fair sort of job that I think that 
they did, within the confines. Everybody was for impeachment 
anyway. The manner in which it was covered and transmitted to 
the American people was so helpful I think. It enabled us to 
do what we did I think, because of the instant total exposure. 
I think that the television debates, if they were debates, the 
television time that we had really is what transmitted to the 
public the neGessity of what we ended up doing. You can falsify 
a whole lot of things or put, make it look like something it's 
not but when it's a man or woman on that tube it sees right 
down to the soles of your feet • . The American people perceived 
that these were real people and the media helped that come 
about. The news media, the newspaper people did a tremendous 
job, too. The media from that sense in news repQ.rting rose 
to its highest level during the coverage of our time. 
Well we want to thank you not just for the primary historical 
information, but really for your just wonderful geniality and 
informality; we really appreciate it. 
Well it's fun to relive it. Seriously. 
The only stipulation is that you have to relive it more 
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